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This thesis examines past and present instances of 
German military intervention in international crises since 
national reunification on 3 October 1990 as a basis for 
evaluating the evolutionary progress Germany has made in 
addressing issues of international security during the same 
period.  It assesses Germany’s accomplishments in context 
of the challenges posed to German political, social, and 
military elites in justifying to their constituencies and 
communities, German leadership commensurate with 
situational necessity borne out of the new reality Germans 
face in light of having regained their national 
sovereignty, as well as with German economic, political and 
military potential. Furthermore, it assesses them in 
context of the relative “unknowns” associated with the 
question of how the German parliament and public would 
respond to the call to assume greater national 
responsibility for regional and international peace and 
security.  Finally, progress is gauged by reactions from 
different international audiences.  This thesis 
investigates the course/progress of intense domestic debate 
associated with Germany’s arrival at major decision 
points/milestones, and uses both objective and subjective 
evaluation to gain further insight into contemporary German 
foreign and security interests and policies, future 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
This thesis examines past and present instances of 
German military intervention in international crises since 
national reunification on 3 October 1990 as a basis for 
evaluating the evolutionary progress Germany has made in 
addressing issues of international security during the same 
period.  Some critics choose to describe the level of 
German effort as measured by its allegedly meek role thus 
far in sorting matters of international peace and security, 
as neither commensurate with Germany’s potential, nor 
satisfactory in terms of one’s reasonable expectations of a 
sovereign German state. 
This thesis asserts that quite on the contrary, 
Germany has made substantial progress, though often 
accompanied by intense domestic dissention, and the 
occasional odd policy or position.  Beginning with the 
perhaps belated, though unequivocal decision handed down by 
the German Supreme Court in 1994, authorizing German 
military intervention in international crises beyond the 
established confines of the North Atlantic Treaty, Germany 
has constructed the imperative constitutional framework for 
full engagement in systems of collective security.  
Furthermore, as evidenced by various international 
perspectives on Germany’s broad involvement in Kosovo, 
concerning both the war effort and the post-war political 
effort to bring lasting peace and stability to the region, 
Germany has indeed addressed its ever-increasing 
international obligations for peace and security, in 
proactive and productive ways.  Finally, with Germany’s 
recent pledge of “unlimited solidarity” with the United 
States and her allies in the war on terror, backed by 
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specific, consequential and measurable action in the form 
of troop commitment, law enforcement, and new legislation, 
Germany presently continues to strive for, and predictably 
within the next decade will take its desired and 
appropriate place at the multinational table where the 
affairs of international peace and security are decidedly 






This thesis examines past and present instances of 
German military intervention in international crises since 
national reunification on 3 October 1990 as a basis for 
evaluating the evolutionary progress Germany has made in 
addressing issues of international security during the same 
period.  It assesses Germany’s accomplishments in context 
of the challenges posed to German political, social, and 
military elites in justifying to their constituencies and 
communities, German leadership commensurate with 
situational necessity borne out of the new reality Germans 
face in light of having regained their national 
sovereignty, as well as with German economic, political and 
military potential. Furthermore, it assesses them in 
context of the relative “unknowns” associated with the 
question of how the German parliament and public would 
respond to the call to assume greater national 
responsibility for regional and international peace and 
security.  Finally, progress is gauged by reactions from 
different international audiences.  This thesis 
investigates the course/progress of intense domestic debate 
associated with Germany’s arrival at major decision 
points/milestones, and uses both objective and subjective 
evaluation to gain further insight into contemporary German 
foreign and security interests and policies, future 
direction, and preparedness to “stay the course.” 
A. BACKGROUND 
 Following the official reunification of Germany on 3 
October 1990, several theories regarding future German 
foreign policy emerged among international audiences.  
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These theories ranged from fears of a resurgence of German 
nationalism coupled with the prospect of full 
remilitarization and the possibility of a sovereign German 
state contesting its borders artificially imposed in the 
aftermath of World War II to reassurances that Germany 
would purposely avoid developing a distinctive foreign 
policy in favor of remaining inextricably linked to 
European and North American powers by virtue of political 
and economic alliances.  In reality, according to Thomas 
Durell-Young, Germany has carved out a rather “uneven, and 
at times confusing record of foreign and defense policy 
formulation and policies since reunification.”1  While 
having periodically exhibited strong national integrity and 
singularity of purpose, perhaps most vividly demonstrated 
by Germany’s rather daring recognition of the independent 
republics of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991 despite primarily 
French objections, Germany continues to reinforce its 
commitment to NATO, the EC, and international coalitions 
formed in response to a variety of crises by its routine 
adherence to a “traditional, and at times cumbersome, 
consensus policy-making process in security and foreign 
affairs.”2 
This thesis contends that Durell-Young’s impression of 
German foreign and defense policies since reunification 
should be qualified, since it appears incongruent with 
another evaluation of German foreign and defense policies, 
                    
1 Thomas Durell-Young, “Force, Statecraft, and German Unity:  The 
Struggle to Adapt Institutions and Practices.”  Available 
[Online]:<http://carlisle-





that considers their collective impact over the same period 
of time.  While the nature of German politics and the 
complex, bureaucratic process of German policy formulation 
(not merely limited to foreign and defense policy, but 
rather inherent to German political culture in the broadest 
sense) in particular often appears to convolute or stifle 
intent, the result of Germany’s efforts over the past 
decade to master its exceptional and formidable social and 
political challenges deserves recognition.  Hence, Germany 
has and continues to demonstrate through both policy and 
action that it is headed “in the right direction.”3  Having 
already met several, critical milestones, Germany presently 
continues to strive for, and predictably within the next 
decade will take its desired, appropriate place at the 
multinational table where the affairs of international 
peace and security are decidedly managed and the world’s 
leading nations are heard. 
Another perhaps more objective, approach to assessing 
German interests in national, regional, and geopolitical 
security policy is to evaluate the overall trend in the use 
of German military force, which in every case has adhered 
to principles of careful, deliberate and measured 
involvement of German military forces in various 
capacities, and has served to actively support the pledges 
made and articulated through German foreign policy.  
Beginning with the largely symbolic yet peripheral 
deployment of German Navy minesweepers and Allied Mobile 
Force units in indirect support of the international 
                    
3 This phrase chosen by the author, who’s wider political views are 
unequivocally American in principle.  Having been raised and educated 
in Germany from 1972 to 1991, the author has developed a commensurate 
understanding of German society. 
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coalition which fought the Gulf War (the preponderance of 
German support was pledged in the form of monetary 
contributions and hardware valued at a total of 17 Billion 
DM), and continuing with the recent pledge of 3,900 German 
troops, including special forces on the ground for combat 
operations in Afghanistan in direct support of the 
coalition against terrorism, both the scale and nature of 
German military involvement in international crises has 
evolved, reflecting not merely the acknowledgement, but the 
desire of Germans to exercise national sovereignty in 
constructive, responsible, and more potent ways. 
Perhaps one of the healthiest indications of this 
phenomenon is Germany’s ongoing effort to secure a seat on 
the United Nations Security Council.  Less than two years 
after reunification, Klaus Kinkel, then Secretary of State 
in the administration of Chancellor Helmut Kohl, 
comprehended in 1992 (as did Konrad Adenauer in his day), 
“that the right to weigh-in politically on affairs 
concerning international security must be paid for in 
military denominations.”  He continued by stating that, 
“Our national interests demand a more active German 
engagement of the United Nations and within its Security 
Council.”  Conclusion:  “We [Germans] must get off the 
spectator benches.”4  Nonetheless, the transition in German 
thinking and the evolution of national understanding hasn’t 
been automatic.  Their evolution has endured its share of 
scrutiny, given the international expectations as well as 
domestic sentiments on the constitutionality of deploying 
German forces outside the geographical boundaries of NATO, 
                    
4 Gunther Latsch und Klaus Wiegrefe, “Einsatz im Machtspiel,”  
Spiegel, 12 November 2001.  37-38. 
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for instance, and the prevailing social climate among the 
German population. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
 This thesis is based on an analytical survey of 
primary and secondary sources concerning the involvement of 
German military forces in international crises since 3 
October 1990, the deliberations and decisions in 
conjunction with the essential question of 
constitutionality with respect to the use of German 
military force, international perspectives on German 
intervention in Kosovo, and the ongoing developments within 
Germany regarding the war on terror.  This thesis 
comprehensively examines the evolution of German military 
involvement in international crises since 3 October 1990, 
within the context of Germany’s return to national 
sovereignty and estimates the nature of the future German 
security posture as it pertains to the use of German 
military force. 
C. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
 Chapter II provides an overview of the instances of 
German military involvement in international crises since 3 
October 1990 including locations, stated missions, 
durations of deployments, capacities, and capabilities of 
assets committed.  Chapter III examines the essential 
question of constitutionality regarding the deployment of 
German military forces outside the geographical boundaries 
of NATO.  Additionally, it examines the course of 
parliamentary and public deliberation, leading to decisions 
in favor of German military participation in international 
coalitions.  Chapter IV discusses German intervention in 
Kosovo from various international perspectives including 
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the U.S, English, French, and German.  Chapter V discusses 
the ongoing debate and developments within Germany 
pertaining to its involvement in the current (2001), 
informally declared war on terror.  Chapter VI offers a 
comprehensive and qualitative evaluation of German military 
involvement in international crises from 3 October 1990 to 
date, and broadly predicts the nature of German use of 
military force in the future as it relates to Germany’s 
























II. INSTANCES OF GERMAN MILITARY INTERVENTION IN 
INTERNATIONAL CRISES SINCE 3 OCTOBER 1990 
 
According to the German newsmagazine Der Spiegel, the 
number of German soldiers currently engaged in operations 
in and around regions of crisis is 7,000.  At the outset of 
the 1990s the number was only a few hundred.5 
A. CHRONOLOGY 
The following is an overview of the instances of German 
military intervention since German national reunification 
on 3 October 1990.6 
q August 1990 – March 1991:  Germany deploys five 
naval minesweepers and two supply vessels with 
approximately 500 sailors to the Mediterranean 
Sea.  Additionally, Germany sends 18 Alpha Jet 
aircraft with over 500 air and ground crew to 
Erhac, Turkey in support of a NATO Intervention 
Force.7  German personnel aboard multi-nationally 
manned NATO AWACS aircraft patrol the airspace 
over East Turkey. 
q April – July 1991:  At the conclusion of the Gulf 
War, and upon the endorsement of the United 
                    





6 Sources used to compile information:  „Einsaetze der Bundeswehr im 
Ausland, Reihe ‚Stichwort fuer die Oeffentlichkeitsarbeit und 
Truppeninfrmation“, Bundesministerium der Verteidigung — Presse-und 
Informationsstab — Referat Oeffentlichkeitsarbeit, Bonn, 2000.  
Available [Online]:<http//www.bundeswehr.de. 
 
7 Properly referred to as an Allied Mobile Force, origionally 
established in 1961 as a NATO-911 Force, consisting of Air and Ground 
components that are rapidly deployable to crisis regions throughout the 
geographical reaches of the alliance. 
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Nations Security Counsel, the German naval 
formation "Südflanke" consisting of six ships and 
480 sailors is dispatched to the Persian Gulf to 
search for naval mines. 
q August 1991 – September 1996:  At any one time, 
30 soldiers employing two CH-53 helicopters and 
operating out of Baghdad, Iraq, and an additional 
seven airmen aboard one C-130 transport aircraft 
based in Bahrain support the United Nations 
Special Commission (UNSCOM) charged with 
supervising the dismantelment of Iraq's weapons 
of mass destruction. 
q May 1992 – November 1993:  Germany sends 150 
medical personnel to Cambodia to establish a 
field hospital with 60 beds to support the United 
Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
(UNTAC). 
q July 1994 – December 1994:  Germany deploys one 
B-707 and two C-160 transport aircraft along with 
30 airmen in support of United Nations Assistance 
Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), to conduct airlift 
operations from Nairobi and Johannesburg to Goma 
and Kigali to provide relief for Rwandan 
refugees. 
q July 1992 – October 1996:  German participation 
in Operation Sharp Guard, mandated by NATO and 
the WEU, consists of sending two ships 
(destroyers or frigates) with 550 sailors on 
average, on four month rotation cycles to the 
Adriatic to enforce the UN imposed trade and 
weapons embargo against Yugoslavia.  Furthermore, 
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three naval electronic reconnaissance aircraft of 
the type Breguet Atlantique with a crew of about 
60 are based in Elmas, Sardinia to conduct 
operations in support of the same.  German 
participation in Operation Deny Flight from April 
1993 to December 1995 consists of 484 personnel 
dedicated to the operation’s aerial surveillance 
component.  From July 1992 to January 1996, 
Germany contributes one C-160 transport aircraft, 
and a crew of 27 to the Falcorona, Italy – 
Sarajevo airlift.  From March 1993 to August 
1995, Germany contributes one C-160 transport 
aircraft and authorizes the use of Frankfurt/Main 
airport for joint U.S.-French-German airdrop 
missions over Bosnia-Herzegovina that primarily 
deliver food and medical supplies. 
q August 1992 – March 1993 (Army), August 1993 – 
March 1994 (airlift):  Germany deploys around 
1700 troops to Belet Uen, Somalia, around 120 
airmen to Dijbouti and Mombasa, Kenya, and around 
600 sailors along with the requisite transport 
and armored vehicles, helicopters, and transport 
aircraft to provide logistical support to UN 
troops and conduct Mombasa – Somalia airlift 
operations in support of United Nations Operation 
in Somalia II (UNSCOM II). 
q August - December 1995:  Germany supports a 
Franco-German Rapid Reaction Force comprised of 
two brigades, aimed at guaranteeing freedom of 
mobility to the United Nations Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The 
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participating German Army contingent in Trogir, 
Croatia comprised of around 530 Soldiers 
establishes a field hospital with 60 beds and a 
pharmacy, and possesses the capability to 
dispatch paramedics in armored as well as 
unarmored vehicles.  The participating German Air 
contingent stationed in Piacenza, Italy consists 
of 14 Tornado fighter aircraft, while up to 12 C-
160 transport aircraft are placed on stand-by at 
locations in Germany.  Additionally, two naval 
long-range reconnaissance aircraft of the type 
Breguet Atlantique complement the air contingent, 
and the German Operation Sharp Guard contingent 
“rolls over.”  The mission of the Rapid Reaction 
Force ends when NATO assumes responsibility for 
operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina on 20 December 
1995, and stands-up IFOR to conduct Operation 
Joint Endeavor to secure implementation of the 
Dayton Accords.  The participating German Army 
contingent of approximately 2600 soldiers on 
average is stationed in neighboring Croatia and 
principally conducts logistical support missions 
in support of IFOR troops as well as specific 
operations aimed at repairing and maintaining 
civilian transportation infrastructure.  The 
participating German Air contingent of almost 500 
airmen is stationed in northern Italy (Vicenza 
and Piacenza) and is tasked with guarding the 
Inter Entity Boundary Lines (IEBL), demarking 
weapons storage facilities and known mass graves, 
protecting the similarly tasked forces on the 
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ground, and performing general air transportation 
missions.  The participating German Naval 
contingent, comprised of 1-2 Frigates, guards 
transportation sea-lanes of and interdicts 
commercial trade vessels as part of Operation 
Sharp Guard and the IFOR Operation Decisive 
Enhancement until the UN trade and weapons 
embargo is lifted in June of 1996.  After 
Operation Sharp Guard in completed, German 
seafaring IFOR participation is limited to one 
frigate in support upon request of NATO’s 
Standing Naval Force Mediterranean 
(STANAVFORMED).  Additionally, German Breguet 
Atlantique naval reconnaissance aircraft fly from 
their home base in Nordholz, Germany to the 
Adriatic to conduct, among other missions, 
signals intelligence support for German fighter 
aircraft patrolling the AOR.  Total German naval 
personnel strength during highest operational 
tempo is almost 300. 
q December 1996 – Present:  NATO replaces IFOR with 
SFOR, to which Germany commits onto Bosnian soil 
one of the largest national contingents 
consisting of 1800 personnel.  This juncture 
marks the first instance of German troop 
deployment directly into the geographical center 
of a crisis. 
q March – June 1999:  Germany contributes Tornado 
Fighter-Bombers and reconnaissance drones to the 
79-day NATO air campaign over Kosovo and Serbia. 
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q June 1999 – Present:  Germany commits around 5000 
personnel to KFOR and is assigned security for 
the Southern zone established within the Province 
of Kosovo. 
q October 1999 – February 2000:  Germany bases in 
Darwin, Australia two C-160 transport aircraft 
specially configured to transport critically 
injured medical patients, to provide rapid 
evacuation of critically injured members of the 
International Force East Timor (INTERFET) and 
individuals in the native population, and to 
provide transportation assistance in the event 
that local hospitals in East Timor become 
overwhelmed. 
q August 2001 – Present:  Germany participates with 
approximately 500 personnel in NATO Operation 
Essential Harvest aimed at facilitating the 
turnover of arms belonging to the Albanian rebels 
in Macedonia.  For the follow-on Operation Amber 
Fox aimed at protecting EU and OSCE observers, 
Germany is committing 600 soldiers. 
q November 2001 – Present:  Germany pledges 3900 
military personnel to the U.S.-led War on 
Terrorism, including 100 Special Forces commandos 
(KSK). 
B. OBSERVATIONS AND INTERPRETATION 
At face value, both the size and scope of German 
military involvement in international crises has increased 
considerably over the past decade.  Beginning with 
Germany’s retrospective discomfort with the rather 
unflattering perception of its merely peripheral military 
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contribution to the coalition in the Gulf War8, over the 
years Germany has proceeded to remove its shackles, as 
evidenced by the unprecedented and internationally well-
received demonstration of direct military support 
(including the assumption of air-combat missions) for the 
coalition that drove Serbian forces out of Kosovo. 
Presently, in light of its recent pledge of 3900 troops, 
including 100 Special Forces for a possible ground combat 
role in Afghanistan, Germany has arrived at yet another 
historic milestone in its quest for equal status among the 
world’s leading nations responsible for matters of 
international peace and security. 
Another look at the above chronology reveals that 
Germany has shown a particular aversion toward intervention 
without the mandate of the United Nations and that examples 
of German intervention without the simultaneous 
participation of at least a few of its NATO partners are 
absent altogether.  This trend is perhaps as much an effect 
of German historical self-consciousness as several tenets 
of German foreign policy: 
1) Peaceful cooperation with our neighbors in a 
spirit of partnership; 
2) Continued development of the North Atlantic 
Alliance (NATO) and transatlantic cooperation 
where Europe must assume a greater share of the 
responsibility; 
3) Deepening and broadening the EU which must become 
a partner fully capable of acting in all areas on 
the global stage; 
                    
8 This is one of the issues discussed in Michael Inacker’s book 
„Unter Ausschluss der Oeffentlichkeit?  Die Deutschen in der 
Golfallianz“, further explained in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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4) Europe-wide cooperation in the OSCE; 
5) Strengthening the international organizations, 
first and foremost the UN, and an active role for 
Germany in these organizations; 
6) A special responsibility for democracy and 
stability in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern 
Europe and the promotion of sustainable 
development in the countries of the South.9 
In particular, the second and fourth tenets reflect the 
forward-leaning posture that Germany is assuming in its 
foreign policy while remaining firmly grounded in its 
network of multi- and international organizations and 
institutions (see all tenets).  Even though continuity 
based on the Federal Republic’s successful strategy over 
the past fifty years has been the order of the day in 
German foreign and security affairs, we are presently 
observing a careful, yet deliberate and necessary move 
toward expanding Germany’s ability to directly influence 
matters of international peace and security.  The 
circumstances surrounding this evolution and the context 
within which German progress ought to be judged will be the 







                    
9 German Foreign Policy.  Available 
[Online]:<http//www.bundeswehr.de/news/english/1_2_german_foreign_polic
y.html.  [8 October 2001]. 
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III. THE QUESTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY 
Whenever the prospect of German military intervention 
abroad is discussed, it is usually linked to the 
fundamental question of whether or not the German 
constitution will allow such a course of action.  
Consequently, each instance of German troop deployment 
abroad involves a deliberative process characterised by 
active scrutiny and often vigorous debate by the German 
parliament and in some cases the blessing of the German 
Supreme Court.  While the matter of interpretation 
concerning the “rather ambiguous and somewhat confusing 
provisions”10 of the German Constitution was resolved via a 
verdict delivered by the Supreme Court on 12 July 1994, the 
preceding national debate heavily impacted German political 
culture and still affects German mentality vis-à-vis “Out 
of Area” deployments of the Bundeswehr. 
The origins of the question of German military 
involvement in so-called “Out of Area” operations are found 
earlier than the 1990s. 
A. THE TWO PLUS FOUR AGREEMENT 
Prior to sorting through the intricacies of the German 
constitution, one ought to first recall a document that 
predates the Supreme Court’s verdict, and affords it the 
legal precedent to entertain arguments on the matter of 
sovereign German “Out of Area” military intervention:  the 
                    
10 John S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken, Political Culture, 
International Institutions, and German Security Policy After 
Unification.  Stanford University Press:  Stanford, California, 1998.  
p175. 
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Two Plus Four Agreement.11  Integral to the agreement are 
the following provisions: 
q The four occupation powers relinquish their 
occupation rights in Germany. 
q Germany regains its full sovereignty for the 
first time since 1945. 
q The current, combined borders of East and West 
Germany are the permanent and incontestable 
borders of a unified Germany, meaning Germany 
accepts the loss of territories East of the Oder-
Neisse Rivers (East Prussia, Silesia, Pomerania) 
ceded to Poland and to the USSR after WW II. 
q Germany foregoes any and all territorial claims 
on other states and shall not assert any in the 
future, specifically in Poland, France, Denmark, 
Czechoslovakia, and the USSR. 
q Germany will remain in NATO under the condition 
that no nuclear weapons will be deployed in East 
Germany, and that the East German army may be 
integrated into the Bundeswehr only after the 
combined strength of the German Army is reduced 
to and capped at 370,000 soldiers. 
q Germany renounces production, procurement and 
independent use of nuclear, biological and 
chemical weapons. 
q Germany attests that war will never again be 
initiated from its soil.12 
                    
11 Signatories to the Two Plus Four Agreement were East and West 
Germany, and the occupying powers of the United States, Great Britain, 
France, and the Soviet Union.  Even though the last occupational forces 
did not withdraw from German soil until 1994, the Two Plus Four 
Agreement legally restored German national sovereignty in 1991. 
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Authored by then German Secretary of State Hans Dietrich 
Genscher, the agreement took effect with the deposition of 
the last ratification document by the Soviet Ambassador to 
Germany on 15 March 1991, upon which Genscher proclaims 
that “Germany has thereby, on this day, received full 
sovereignty over its domestic and foreign affairs.”13 
B. THE DILEMMA 
Produced in the aftermath of World War II, the German 
“Grundgesetz” (Basic Law or Constitution) was borne, and 
ratified by the United States Congress in 1949.  One of its 
principal aims was to legally preclude the German nation 
from ever planning for an “Angriffskrieg” offensive war 
again.  Accordingly, Article 26.1 of the German 
Constitution states that, “Acts tending to and undertaken 
with intent to disturb the peaceful relations between 
nations, especially to prepare war or aggression, are 
unconstitutional.  They have to be made a criminal 
offence.”14  However, Article 87a was added to the 
constitution in 1956, at a time when NATO deemed it in the 
best interest of the alliance for Germany to rearm, 
creating the constitutional basis for the Bundeswehr 
(German Armed Forces).  Paragraph 1 states that “the 
                    
12 German Unification Case Study, Treaty on the Final Settlement With 
Respect to Germany.  Available  [Online]:<http:// 
www.foothill.fhda.edu/unification/finalset.html.  [8 December 
2001]. 
 
13 Erklaerung des Bundesministers des Auswaertigen, Genscher, 
anlaeslich der 1. Lesung des Vertrages ueber gute Nachbarschaft, 
Partnerschaft und Zusammenarbeit mit der UdSSR im Deutschen Bundestag 
am 15. Maerz 1991 (Auszuege), Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, Dokumente von 1949 bis 1994, Koeln, 1995.  s. 793. 
 
14 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany.  Available  
[Online]:<http:// www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/gm00000_.html.  [8 
December 2001]. 
  18 
Federation shall establish Armed Forces for defense 
purposes”, while paragraph 2 adds that “other than for 
defence purposes, the Armed Forces may only be employed to 
the extent explicitly permitted by this Basic Law.”15  When 
considered in conjunction with Chapter Xa, on the so-called 
“State of Defense”, added in 1968, Article 87a could be 
interpreted along more restrictive lines as allowing the 
Bundeswehr to be used solely for the defense of German 
territory.  On the other hand, Article 24.2 states that 
“For the purpose of maintaining peace, the Federation may 
join a system of mutual collective security; in doing so it 
will consent to such limitations upon its rights of 
sovereignty as will bring about and secure a peaceful and 
lasting order in Europe and among the nations of the 
world.”16  Implicitly, a more liberal interpretation could 
contend that Germany may thus legitimately belong to the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)17, which from its 
inception in 1948 until this day remains and for the 
foreseeable future will remain the bedrock of German 
defense and security strategy, as well as the United 
Nations Organization (UNO)18, to which Germany has been a 






17 Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty asserts that “an armed 
attack against one shall be considered an attack against all.” 
 
18 Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations reserves “the 
inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed 
attack occurs against a member of the United Nations.” 
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party since the early 1970s, and in which Germany has found 
the institution best suited to represent the moral guide 
for German foreign policy formulation.   
“Over the years, a strong cross-party consensus had 
formed around an intermediate, although still rather 
narrow, interpretation [of the constitution].”19  This 
consensus reflected prominently throughout the 1980s, and 
would have allowed for the use of the Bundeswehr in defense 
of Germany and its NATO allies, but no further.  This view 
was largely a reaction to the 1979-80 shift in NATO 
strategic planning which foresaw a dual role for alliance 
forces stationed in the European theatre.  In addition to 
deterring a Soviet attack in central Europe, European 
forces would be called upon to counter threats to the 
alliance emanating from outside its originally contemplated 
geographical sphere of influence.20  This shift proved 
rather unsettling to the German leadership, which in 
Duffield’s words “feared that military involvement in out-
of-area conflicts could lead to a direct clash with East 
German forces or provoke Soviet retaliation in Central 
Europe.  Thus abstention from such missions was necessary 
to preserve detente in Europe and even to maintain the 
                    
19John S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken, Political Culture, 
International Institutions, and German Security Policy After 
Unification.  Stanford University Press:  Stanford, California, 1998.  
p175. 
  
20 Several developments in the world with potentially far reaching 
implications to the Cold War status quo between East and West served to 
initiate the change in NATO strategic thinking.  The Ayatollah 
Khomeni’s rise to power in Iran in 1979, the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan also in 1979, and the outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq 
in 1980 all represented the possibility of a clash between forces of 
NATO and the Warsaw Pact. 
  20 
domestic consensus behind German security policy.“21  In 
this context it comes as no surprise that in 1982 the 
narrow, consensus based interpretation of the German 
Constitution “was formalized in back-to back decisions by 
the cabinet-level Federal Security Council involving first 
the SPD-FDP coalition government (Sept.1) just before its 
dissolution and the new CDU/CSU-FDP government (Nov. 3) 
shortly after it took office.”22 
Nonetheless, the defining international crises of the 
early to mid 1990s (Gulf War, Bosnia, Somalia) forced the 
Germans to re-evaluate their policy in light of the 
increased impetus to act in ways commensurate with the 
responsibilities of a sovereign German state.  The out-of-
area debate became reenergized when then Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl and his party took the position, that “the Bundeswehr 
should be able to participate in the full range of military 
measures that might be authorized by the UN, including 
peace-enforcement efforts under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, regardless of whether they were conducted under 
the UN flag or organized along the looser pattern of the 
Gulf War coalition.”23  Furthermore, the Christian 
Democratic Union (CDU) argued that the constitution already 
permitted such out-of-area military missions as they 
                    
 
21 John S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken, Political Culture, 
International Institutions, and German Security Policy After 
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envisioned, and thus technically didn’t require an 
amendment.  Immediately, this position drew intense flak 
from the opposition led by the Social Democratic Party 
(SPD), which not only contended that the Bundeswehr should 
be banned from participating in any kind of out-of-area 
mission with the exception of peacekeeping given a direct 
UN mandate, but also that an amendment to the constitution 
would indeed be the prerequisite for Bundeswehr 
participation in even so limited activities as UN 
peacekeeping operations.24 
C. RESOLUTION AND LEGACY 
The debate continued through several stages, and when 
reconciliation between the two positions was finally deemed 
beyond the means of parliamentary procedure, the task of 
collectively and definitively interpreting the 
aforementioned articles of the constitution fell to the 
German Supreme Court.  The Court handed down its decision 
on 12 July 1994, determining that “Without restriction, 
German soldiers may participate in UN missions of peace 
outside the geographical boundaries of the NATO alliance.  
Combat missions are thereby permitted by the Constitution 
as well, provided that the Bundestag by way of simple 
majority approves each and every case.  Hence, claims of 
unconstitutionality regarding the deployment of German 
military forces in the area of former Yugoslavia and in 
                    
24 The disagreement over whether or not a constitutional amendment 
was required, even in the event that both  government and opposition 
leaders could agree on the exact nature of the missions that Germany 
would participate in, carried imense importance at the time, for it was 
unclear if the FDP (the CDU’s coalition partner in government) would 
support an amendment. 
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Somalia are thereby dismissed.”25  By virtue of its 
decision, the German Supreme Court effectively paved the 
way for future German military operations abroad. 
The implications of the court’s ruling found expression 
in a series of criteria, set by the government, that future 
out-of-area deployments of the Bundeswehr would have to 
meet.  While these criteria were designed to prevent 
impulsive decisions to commit German troops26 (one of the 
more bitter lessons learned in light of the outcome of the 
UN mission in Somalia) they clearly complement the court’s 
ruling, grant further insight into the direction Germany is 
prepared to embark as regards out-of-area deployments, and 
offer substantial grounds for allies as well as potential 
adversaries to evaluate the potential for future German 
military intervention.  The criteria are specified as 
follows:  
q There must be a clear and legitimate 
international mandate, usually from the UN but 
also possibly from the CSCE in the case of 
peacekeeping operations; 
q It must be possible to fulfil the assigned 
military tasks within a clearly limited 
timeframe; 
                    
25 40 Jahre Bundeswehr, 5 Jahre Armee der Einheit, Bundesministerium 
der Verteidigung, Bonn, 1995, s. 31. 
 
26 This attitude was further necessitated by the fact that the 
Bundeswehr had not developed the capacity to support substantial out-
of-area operations, that German public opinion vis-a-vis out-of area 
deployments of the Bundeswehr  was recorded with merely a slight 
majority in favor of peacekeeping operations, and only a quarter to a 
third in favor of combat operations, and thirdly that “the attitudes of 
most German political leaders continued to be strongly colored by the 
postwar ‘culture of reticence.”(Duffield, 210)  
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q The military component of the operation must be 
based upon a convincing political concept for a 
lasting solution to the conflict; 
q Germany must be adequately involved in the 
international decision making process; 
q Germany would participate in international peace 
missions only jointly with others and almost 
exclusively in conjunction with its NATO and 
Western European Union (WEU) allies, which would 
allow them to draw upon pre-existing common 
structures; 
q Finally, the interests of Germany, Europe, or the 
international community must be involved.  
Moreover, the greater the likelihood of combat 
and thus the risk to German soldiers, the more 
compelling the reasons for German participation 
must be.27 
Though the tone is deliberately careful, the unequivocal 
result of having drastically increased Germany’s 
“aussenpolitische Handlungsfaehigkeit” (ability to act in 
foreign policy), along with the underlying intent is what 
constitutes the true legacy of this important milestone in 
German history since reunification is undeniably an 
enormous step “in the right direction.” 
 
 
                    
 
27 John S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken, Political Culture, 
International Institutions, and German Security Policy After 
Unification.  Stanford University Press:  Stanford, California, 1998.  
p. 211. 
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 IV. PERCEPTIONS OF GERMAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN 
KOSOVO 
 
Perhaps the clearest example of German foreign policy 
objectives can be seen by assessing the role that Germany 
played in the resolution of the Kosovo crisis and of the 
associated “Einsatz der Bundeswehr” (deployment of the 
German military) in particular.   
A. THE GERMAN PERSPECTIVE 
As might be expected, the German perspective focuses 
on the importance of its political and diplomatic 
contributions, rather than measuring its military 
involvement.  Wolfgang Brauner articulates the German 
perspective by asserting that “Germany acted according to 
its identity as a ‘civilian’28, and European power. This 
civilian identity shaped Germany’s perception of the 
conflict and its preferences for its resolution.  Germany 
acted according to the so-called "logic of appropriateness" 
within a highly institutionalized multilateral context 
(NATO, UNSC, EU, OSCE, G-7/8, Contact Group).29  Brauner 
follows up by drawing attention to the so-called “Fischer-
                    
28 Germany’s self-image as a “Zivilmacht” is primarily a result of 
historical lessons learned after the total defeat of the Third Reich, 
yet in light of German reunification also served to calm primarily 
French and Polish concerns that Germany may adopt an aggressive, 
unilateral defense posture typically associated with the ambitions of a 
classic superpower.  It infers that modern Germany’s main recourse for 
effecting foreign policy is consistent with diplomatic efforts backed 
by political, social and economic leverage.  Nonetheless, it does not 
imply that Germany is precluded from resorting to military force within 
the context of systems of collective security.  In practical terms, it 
simply means that German foreign policy seeks to “exploit every 
conceivable option for a negotiated settlement before resorting to the 
use of force.”(Brauner) 
 
29 Wolfgang Brauner, German Foreign Policy in Dialogue, Germany’s 
Participation in the Military Intervention in Kosovo as Viewed from 
Different National Perspectives, The German Perspective.  Available 
[Online]<http://www.deutsche-
aussenpolitik.de/publications/newsletter/issue01.html. 
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Plan”, proposed by the German Foreign Minister on April 14, 
1999, and adopted by NATO later that month, at its 
Washington Summit (April 23-24, 1999).  The plan 
effectively combines what is referred to as a “double-
strategy”, involving diplomatic and military aspects aimed 
at accelerating negotiations to a political settlement of 
the conflict. 
Secondly, Brauner points out “Most importantly, 
Germany succeeded in contributing substantially to the 
definition and maintenance of a common policy of the EU, 
including unanimous support of NATO's Operation Allied 
Force and extensive sanctions. The EU considered NATO's 
intervention to be ‘necessary and justified’. The extent of 
this unity contrasts starkly with the divisions between the 
member states that largely paralyzed the EU during the 
first three wars in former Yugoslavia.”30 
Finally, the German perspective emphasizes the role 
Germany played during its presidency in the EU. During 
Germany’s presidency the EU generated the Stability Pact 
for Southeast Europe, in which the EU “explicitly 
recognizes this region to be an integral part of Europe and 
takes responsibility for its stabilization, reconstruction 
and transformation”31, by offering prospective membership 
in the EU as an incentive to countries in the region, that 
promote peace and stability. 
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B. THE FRENCH PERSPECTIVE 
The French reaction to German involvement in Kosovo 
was positive.  According to Hans Stark, despite the 
perception of a strained Franco-German relationship due to 
the French government’s unheeded objection to German 
official recognition of Slovenian and Croatian independence 
in December of 1991 without sufficient consultation or the 
acquiescence of the EU, a strong consensus exists between 
the two countries regarding the principal causes for the 
crisis in former Yugoslavia.  Both France and Germany agree 
on two central issues:  the main responsibility for the 
origin of the crisis lay with the Serbs, not with the 
Kosovars, and that recognizing the independence of the 
Kosovo-Albanian minority would lead to further 
destabilization of the region.32  Thus, the French do not 
view the German military intervention as being suggestive 
of a larger German quest for power and influence, but 
rather as proof of “continuity” in German foreign policy, 
in turn removing any possible doubts about Germany’s 
“Buendnistreue” (loyalty to alliance). 
Furthermore, the French took great comfort in 
observing the diligence with which the German political 
leadership approached, and eventually arrived at their 
decision to intervene militarily in the crisis.33  The 
German ability to accommodate Washington (by honoring their 
                    
32 Hans Stark, German Foreign Policy in Dialogue, Germany’s 
Participation in the Military Intervention in Kosovo as Viewed from 
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transatlantic alliance obligation), Paris (via Franco-
German talks held in Toulouse, and at the EU-Summit in 
Cologne), and Moscow (through the G-8 initiative to bring 
the Russians into the coalition to mediate vis-à-vis 
Belgrade) met with great respect in France.  On a tactical 
and operational level, French opinion also praised 
Germany’s abstention from bombing civilian targets with its 
limited number of six combat aircraft participating in the 
air campaign of Operation Allied Force. 
Above all, the French applaud Germany’s initiative in 
forming the aforementioned Stability Pact, as well as 
Germany’s assumption of responsibility for one of the five 
military sectors established in post-war Kosovo.34  To the 
French, this demonstrated Germany’s interest in continued 
financial and political engagement in the region.  
Conversely, a German engagement curtailed merely to the war 
effort would presumably have been interpreted by the French 
as insincere, and as depriving the region of any real 
opportunity for lasting peace and stability. 
C. THE BRITISH PERSPECTIVE 
While the British perspective does reserve slight 
criticism in terms of what could have happened, and what 
may yet happen, in the words of John Roper, “There was 
surprise and admiration in Britain that the relatively new 
Social Democrat/Green German administration was able to 
play so constructive a part in Operation Allied Force 
[despite loud, domestic opposition] in the first half of 
1999.”35  Britain also believes that Germany deserves great 
                    
34 Ibid. 
 
35 John Roper, German Foreign Policy in Dialogue, Germany’s 
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credit on the diplomatic front for successfully integrating 
the Russians in the negotiations with Belgrade. 
Furthermore, Britain is nothing short of satisfied with the 
mutual success of Germany’s executive (second-in-command) 
relationship with Britain at the helm of KFOR upon the 
secession of hostilities in Kosovo. 
On the other hand, Britain’s leaders express 
reservations about Germany’s position on the possible 
eventual introduction of ground forces during the 
conflict.36  Germany categorically, and prematurely 
according to British opinion, ruled-out the option, raising 
concern in Britain that Germany may well react the same way 
during a similar, future crisis, in which the coalition 
experiences less success in its air campaign.  
Additionally, British public opinion doesn’t reflect the 
all-round optimism surrounding the establishment of the 
Stability Pact, contending that it remains to be seen if 
the respective governments who are parties to the pact 
actually “provide substance [financial resources] to the 
rhetoric”37. Since governments often fail to do just that, 
an otherwise promising initiative may well become left 
without any hope for success.  Finally, Britain’s 
leadership has voiced open criticism over the archaic 
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internal structure and accompanying policies (primarily 
regarding conscription) of the Bundeswehr, which remains 
reminiscent of the Cold War.38  Britain political and 
military leaders claim that the Bundeswehr is neither 
suited nor capable of responding appropriately to 
additional future threats to European security, and holds 
little hope that in the current environment of shrinking 
German defense budgets, the Bundeswehr will see a required, 
drastic course correction anytime soon. 
D. THE AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE 
The American perspective, according to Thomas Banchoff 
acknowledged Germany’s “continued Atlantic orientation”, 
showing that Germany has concurrently “adjusted its 
security policy instruments to a new post-cold war 
constellation.”39  Although certain trans-Atlantic tensions 
reminiscent of the 1980s came to light, including 
Chancellor Schroeder’s idea of a cease fire to allow 
Serbian forces to withdraw, and his overt opposition to the 
use of ground troops in the conflict, Banchoff contends 
that “U.S. policymakers’ awareness of the constraints of 
German domestic politics helped to keep irritations from 
breaking out into open division.  So too, of course, did 
Milosevic’s unexpected capitulation.”40 




39 Thomas Banchoff, German Foreign Policy in Dialogue, Germany’s 
Participation in the Military Intervention in Kosovo as Viewed from 
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E. THE AUTHOR’S PERSPECTIVE 
The uniformly positive international opinion of German 
involvement in Kosovo provides ample evidence that Germans 
have shed their disjointed and controversial reputation as 
second-rate allies inherited directly from their quibbling 
about their willingness to support the coalition that 
liberated Kuwait from Iraqi occupation in 1991.  Indeed, 
contemporary German public opinion reflects the view that 
Germany in essence “hat sich freigekauft”41 (bought itself 
out of) the Gulf War.  Michael Innacker adds that “In 
relation to the Gulf War, the lingering experience of the 
allies is that the Germans are in fact allies, but only 
allies with limited liability when it comes to countering 
violations of international law and defending common 
political goals and interests.”42 Nonetheless, the Gulf War 
after-action depiction of Germany by Inacker from the 
perspective of Germany’s allies contrasts considerably with 
the allied perspectives gained after observing German 
involvement in Kosovo, giving further credence to the 
opinion that Germany is proactively and productively 
addressing its increasing international obligations for 
peace and security,. 
 
                    
 
41 Gunther Latsch und Klaus Wiegrefe, “Einsatz im Machtspiel,”  
Spiegel, 12 November 2001.  37. 
 
42 Michal Inacker, ‘Unter Ausschluss der Oeffentlichkeit?  Die 
Deutschen in der Golfallianz.”  Bouvier Verlag, Bonn, 1991.  s. 161. 
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V. GERMANY IN THE WAR ON TERROR 
Undoubtedly, the strongest indication yet of German 
resolve to play a more proactive role in affecting 
developments on matters of international peace and security 
--a role commensurate with its status as a sovereign 
nation, European leader, and world trustee-- are the recent 
political developments within Germany pertaining to the 
U.S. led war on terror.  In a policy statement by Federal 
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder in the German Bundestag on 8 
November 2001, he reminds that in a joint resolution 
adopted on 19 September 2001 “The German Bundestag endorses 
the Government’s intention to follow up its declarations of 
unqualified solidarity with the United States with concrete 
measures of support.  These include political and economic 
assistance as well as the provision of suitable military 
capabilities to combat international terrorism.”43  Both 
the unequivocal tone and specific content of this statement 
are proof of Germany’s ability to preserve the integrity of 
its decision making process as well as Germany’s 
preparedness to exercise its national sovereignty. This is 
true, considering that only a sovereign nation’s government 
would have the moral right to commit its country’s 
political, economic, and most tellingly military support to 
a cause; a cause moreover, that assumes a considerable 
portion of its legitimacy by virtue of the credibility 




                    
43 Participation of German Armed Forces in the Fight Against 
International Terrorism, Policy Statement by Federal Chancellor Gerhard 
Schroeder in the German Bundestag, Berlin, 8 November 2001. 
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A. THE GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONSHIP 
Of particular note in the discussion of German commitment 
to direct military involvement in the U.S. led war on 
terror are both the German mentality toward alliance and 
collective security as well as contemporary German 
sentiment toward the United States borne of the special 
relationship the Germans have fostered with the Americans 
over the course of nearly fifty years of occupation, and 
alluded to in Chancellor Schroeder’s closing remarks.  He 
remarks, 
“Let me say in conclusion that another reason for 
our decision [in favor of military intervention] 
was to show that Germany is capable of meeting 
its obligations to the Alliance. For more than 50 
years the United States has given us its solid 
support. It was the Americans who made it 
possible for us to rejoin the international 
community, who guaranteed our freedom and helped 
us regain our national unity. Over many decades 
we have taken American solidarity for granted and 
used it to our advantage. 
But Alliance solidarity is not a one-way street. 
That is why we must now render our practical 
contribution to that solidarity - the purpose of 
which, after all, is to defend our common values, 
attain common objectives, and build our future 
together in security and freedom. We do this in 
open, democratic and also critical discussion, 
but ultimately also, I hope, in great unison.”44 
With this statement Chancellor Schroeder not only 
verbalizes the genuine gratitude and desire to reciprocate 
for the half-century of ubiquitous support that the United 
States has provided in guaranteeing the peace, security and 
prosperity of the German people, but illustrates 
Schroeder’s complete understanding of the full range of 
                    
 
44 Ibid. 
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articles inherent to the North Atlantic Treaty.  Beyond 
Article 5, which provides for the common defence of its 
members, he makes a distinct reference to Article 2, which 
perhaps more importantly captures the essence of the 
alliance as a community of values.  By choosing this line 
of argument, combining an emotional element with the 
irrefutable, traditional cornerstone to German security and 
defense strategy, German Chancellor Schroeder finds the 
optimal justification for what’s next, the involvement of 
German military forces in new and greater capacities than 
previously seen.  By the same token, one should mention 
that Chancellor Helmut Kohl echoed the same sentiment over 
a decade earlier.  In a policy statement delivered to the 
German Senate, he decreed “We stand irrevocably in support 
of our alliance, our solidarity, and to our community of 
values with the free democracies of the West, especially 
with the United States of America.”45  Equally significant 
to the common theme of both Chancellors’ statements is that 
Chancellor Schroeder belongs to the slightly “left of 
center” Social Democratic Party, whereas his predecessor 
occupied the helm of an administration dominated by the 
ideologically opposed, moderate-conservative Christian 
Democratic Union.  Hence, the views expressed by both 
politicians reflect continuity and truly bipartisan opinion 
between the two strongest political parties in Germany 
since the formation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 
the latter half of 1949.  This mostly pro-American mindset 
within German society indeed has been the national, social 
foundation allowing for German leaders to use language such 
                    
45 Aussenpolitik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Dokumente von 1949 
bis 1994, Herausgegeben aus Anlaß des 125. Jubiläums des Auswertigen 
Amts.  Köln:  Verl. Wiss. Und Politik, 1995.  s. 729. 
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as “unlimited solidarity with the United States in the war 
on terrorism.” 
B. THE STICKING POINT 
 To date, the German government has pledged 3,900 
German troops to the ongoing war effort in Afghanistan.  
The various missions these troops are capable of performing 
are mostly familiar:  covering Nuclear, Biological, 
Chemical  (NBC) defense, medical evacuation of the wounded, 
air transportation of troops, equipment and supplies, as 
well as naval forces to protect shipping lanes and vessels.  
Yet, one exception to the previous nature of employing 
German military forces in crises has empirically altered 
the debate.  In the case of the war on terror, the 
administration has won the argument to commit 100 Special 
Forces Commandos to aid U.S. forces in a manner that 
produced one of the most historic votes in the German 
Bundestag since its inception. 
C. EXTRAORDINARY MEASURES 
Demonstrating both keen political sensitivity and 
impeccable judgement, Schroeder properly sensed that the 
timing was right for him to engage in a wager of the 
highest stakes, placing the survival of his administration 
on the table in hopes of attaining parliamentary 
authorization for the employment of German Special Forces 
in prospective combat operations in the war on terror.  
Thus, he opted in accordance with Article 68 of the German 
Constitution to combine a general vote of confidence in 
himself and his administration with the deployment of 
German military forces in the war on terror.  For the sake 
of gaining perspective on the gravity of Schroeder’s wager, 
  37 
Werner Perger in an article appearing in the German journal 
Die Zeit writes, 
“The vote of confidence is the heaviest weapon at 
the disposal of the Federal Chancellor in 
parliamentary battle.  It is normally brought to 
bear when all other arguments have failed, all 
powers of persuasion have proven fruitless, and 
appeals for discipline have shown no effect.  The 
vote of confidence is the ultimate case of 
emergency.  It involves a great risk.  A ‘nay’ 
effectively means the end of any government’s 
administration [and implies new national 
elections].  An ‘aye’ [the requisite majority for 
which, is at least 50 percent of the Bundestag 
vote] - currently 334 votes - optimally could 
infuse the whole operation with new momentum.  
Unity in view of the power question can surely 
help an administration under acute, political 
pressure.”46 
One of the critical circumstances leading to Chancellor 
Schroeder’s decision to call for the vote of confidence was 
the potentially significant opposition to his vision of 
German participation in the war against terror he sensed 
from within the ranks of his “red-green” (Social Democrat-
Green) coalition government, not to mention from within his 
own political party.  As Perger observes there’s a 
precedent to this concern, considering that “in the past 
years Gerhart Schroeder has already had to demand several 
decisions from his administration which one really could 
not have expected from this difficult alliance 
(Kosovo/Macedonia).  Social Democrats and Greens who two 
decades ago were still entangled in resisting the nuclear 
retrofitting of NATO, who in the early nineties were still 
                    
 
46 Werner Perger, „Schröders große Schlacht, Afghanistan und die rot-
grüne Vertrauenskrise.“  Available 
[Online]:<http://www.zeit.de/2001/47/Politik/200147_1._leiter.html.  [4 
December 2001]. 
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opposed to any sort of deployment of German military forces 
outside the geographical boundaries of the alliance, have 
now arrived at the limit of all possibility.”47 
D. THE DYNAMIC BEHIND THE DEBATE 
A brief examination of the debate surrounding the vote 
on the obligatory Bundestag mandate to allow Germany to 
lend military support to the anti-terror campaign outside 
the confines of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
reveals further insight into the political and social 
dynamic in Germany as of late. A limited sketch of the 
make-up of the present German government shows it to be 
made up of a "red-green" coalition consisting of the Social 
Democratic Party and the Bündnis 90/Green party. Both 
parties have pacifist factions, the Greens being 
practically founded on pacifist, environmental, and anti-
nuclear idealistic principles. However, as the party over 
the last decade began to find sufficient political support 
among the population resulting in its members being elected 
into positions of responsibility, the party was forced to 
accept compromises as a pre-condition for being in the 
government. In time, and as a consequence, it has gradually 
split into fundamentalist "Fundis" and  realist "Realos". 
The former faction supports the idealism manifested in 
"conservative" grass roots organizations of the party, and 
the latter accept the need to compromise where these basic 
ideals are concerned. The former are prepared to give up 
the chance to govern and comfortably remain an opposition 
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party, whereas the latter want to play a direct part in the 
implementation or formation of government policies, as much 
as the "market" can bear. 
The German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder has had to 
accommodate the above situation in order to maintain his 
coalition and continue to govern.  He has succeeded in the 
past three years mostly on the basis of his charismatic 
leadership and professional skill, and probably even more 
significantly, due to weak conservative and liberal 
opposition parties, not to mention the "renegade" PDS, the 
follow-up party to the communists in the GDR, irrelevant 
nationally, but very significant still in the "new" states 
and the city of Berlin.  
The stage was set for the confrontation that took place 
in the Bundestag in November, 2001. The catalyst was Sept 
11, and the subsequent declaration by Chancellor Schröder 
of Germany's desire to show "unlimited solidarity" with the 
American people and support for the "war on terrorism." 
This stance was unequivocally voiced and actively supported 
by Joschka Fischer, the Foreign Minister, a Green Realo. 
But, with the passage of a few weeks and a seemingly 
ineffectual bombing campaign on the part of the American 
military in Afghanistan, the grass roots Green pacifist 
Fundis demanded qualification of the word "unlimited" --  
and with that the political debate was defined and 
underway. The problem was that the debate was within the 
coalition and not between government and opposition.  
Should his shaky coalition fail to muster a majority on its 
own, Schroeder’s initial reaction was simply to circumvent 
the issue by relying on the votes of the conservative 
opposition to achieve the needed majority in the Bundestag. 
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However, reading the political tide correctly, and 
realizing that such a less than desirable solution would 
come only at great expense to his own political capital, or 
rather the perception of his leadership potential, he soon 
distanced himself from his earlier indications that he 
would rely on the opposition.  Affirming that the gravity 
and sheer magnitude of the question, involving what David 
Hudson describes as “The vote for approval of Germany’s 
largest military adventure since World War II”48, demands 
that the direction set by the administration be carried at 
a minimum by the same mandate within the Bundestag that 
bears responsibility for its appointment to office, 
Schroeder first sought advice from former leaders of the 
SPD, including Helmut Schmidt and Hans Apel, and then 
decided to link the obligatory vote on a mandate to support 
the American war on terror militarily with a vote of 
confidence in the government.  A master stroke.49 
The combination vote caused the dynamic within the 
Bundestag to change abruptly.  The CDU and FDP previously 
intended to vote unanimously in favor of sending troops to 
demonstrate Germany’s “unlimited solidarity”; however they 
executed an about-face and voting unanimously against the 
continuation of the present government of Chancellor 
Schroeder in hopes of inviting its dissolution.  
                    
48 David Hudson, “Confidence Man, Weeekly Review:  Schroeder’s 
historic ‘win-win’ gamble has landed the Greens in a ‘loose-loose’ 
dilemma.”  Available 
[Online]:<http://www.heise.de/tp/english/inhalt/te/11150/1.html.  [11 
December 2001]. 
 
49 For Chancellor Schröder and for Minister Fischer the increasingly 
irritating recalcitrance within their own parties was weakening the 
work of the coalition in general and, if it were not checked soon, it 
would also threaten the almost assured victory of the Red/Green 
coalition in the national election in the fall of 2002. 
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Consequently, Schroeder succeeded not only in forcing the 
conservative opposition into a position in which it 
ultimately would in Hudson’s words “come-off looking as if 
playing politics was more important to them than their oft-
professed loyalty to Germany’s allies, in particular to the 
United States”50, but also in creating a additional “win-
win” situation for himself.  Hudson observes, 
“Winning the vote would obviously be nice.  
Schroeder would prove that he could play hardball 
and whip his minions back in line.  But in the 
long run, losing might have been even better. 
Schröder would have had a couple of options, but 
rather than review them all, let's cut to the 
most attractive: he could call for new elections.  
A glance at the current political landscape 
reveals that he would be extremely well 
positioned for such an early date with the voting 
public. While his own popularity ratings soar, 
the CDU is in a shambles. Practically the 
laughing-stock of the country, the party can't 
even decide on a candidate for chancellor for the 
election scheduled less than a year away in the 
first place. The Liberals51, in the meantime, are 
profiting from the CDU's mess, and Schröder has 
made a point twice in the last week of blessing 
the FDP with two high-profile meetings with its 
                    
 
50 David Hudson, “Confidence Man, Weeekly Review:  Schroeder’s 
historic ‘win-win’ gamble has landed the Greens in a ‘loose-loose’ 
dilemma.”  Available 




51 Unlike in U.S. politics, “liberal” does not describe a position to 
the far left of the political spectrum.  Rather, in Germany, the term 
“liberal” refers to the Free Democratic Party (FDP), and connotes 
“Freedom of the Individual” reminiscent of the French Revolution, and 
“Laissez-Faire” economic policies.  In the German political spectrum 
the FDP is positioned in the perfect center, between the SPD and CDU.  
For the sake of ideological comparison, both the Democratic and 
Republican Parties in the United States would fall within the scope of 
the FDP, given the party’s left and right-most lateral limits, 
respectively. 
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leadership. Should the "red-green” coalition fall 
apart, few doubt that “red-yellow” (yellow being 
the Liberals’ color) would be quick to follow.”52 
In the end, Schroeder received the vote of confidence with 
the full support of his social democratic party, and the 
proven ability of the Greens to make compromises when 
compromises are necessary. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The significance of the developments elaborated above is 
in the resolute sense of purpose with which the current 
German leadership engages in bringing about a categorical 
change in Germany’s role on the international stage.  The 
fact that the Chancellor was willing to confront his party 
and his broader mandate in the Bundestag with the 
alternative between governance or returning to political 
opposition, and that he ultimately prevailed in winning the 
vote of confidence, underscores that Germany is 










                    
 
52 David Hudson, “Confidence Man, Weeekly Review:  Schroeder’s 
historic ‘win-win’ gamble has landed the Greens in a ‘loose-loose’ 
dilemma.”  Available 
[Online]:<http://www.heise.de/tp/english/inhalt/te/11150/1.html.  [11 
December 2001]. 
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VI. EVALUATION AND PERSPECTIVE 
Few critics can refute the basic theme developed in the 
previous five chapters:  namely that the Federal Republic 
of Germany has made substantive progress in assuming a 
leadership role in the strategic defense of a united Europe 
and in fulfilling the expanding military needs of NATO in 
and outside of the geopolitical confines of a too narrowly 
defined potential European theater of conflict. To the 
Anglo-Saxon (German English for U.S. Americans and 
British), in particular, this "progress" might be viewed 
with a critical or even cynical eye, but an impartial 
observer can assign credence to the theory that there exist 
imperative historical causes for Germany to show 
hesitation, if not reluctance, to proactively joining a 
more broadly defined military fray, particularly, when 
German soldiers are to be given potentially hazardous 
assignments. 
This German stance is largely a consequence of the 
guilt complex successfully imposed by the victorious allies 
upon a defeated and totally demoralized German people after 
the Second World War. Reconstituting a military in 1955 and 
1956 in the form of a Bundeswehr was not at first supported 
by an approving majority of the German population. On the 
contrary, Konrad Adenauer had to cajole, convince and 
ultimately almost single-handedly impose upon the West 
Germans the idea that a Bundeswehr was necessary for 
Germany to be firmly and permanently integrated in the 
western alliance camp. For him this was the price that had 
to be paid for a stable Europe and, in turn, a secure 
Germany.  A brief glance at Japan's recent bold move to 
contribute military forces to the anti-terrorist campaign 
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in Afghanistan is a revealing parallel of how intensely 
controversial the efforts are in these once devastated 
societies to overcome internalized pacifist values as a 
consequence of externally imposed measures taken at the 
conclusion of and subsequent to World War II.  
In short, the deep-seated German conviction, which has 
in "Anglo-Saxon" terms over time become convenience, to 
remain uninvolved or only indirectly involved (financially) 
in military conflicts has established a permanent presence 
in the political make-up of German society and its 
political discourse.  This fact is unmistakably evident in 
the most recent debates that have intensified due to the 
terrorist actions in New York and Washington, D.C. "Nie 
wieder Krieg" (no more war) had been the potent, prevailing 
slogan ever since the Second World War. However, German 
sentiment quickly changed in light of the atrocities being 
committed in former Yugoslavia during the mid and late 
1990s, leading to the German decision to intervene 
militarily in the crisis under the slogan “Nie wieder 
Voelkermord (no more genocide).”  After Sept 11, Federal 
Chancellor Schroeder, whose father was killed in the war, 
and who, as an opposition Social Democratic Party 
politician, always staunchly supported the demand that 
Germany refrain from becoming involved in military 
conflicts, has now reversed his opinion, claiming that it 
is now the proper time for Germany to assume its 
responsibility as a leader in a changing Europe and a 
changing world. He eloquently and forcefully proclaimed in 
the Bundestag that it is now impossible for Germany to 
refuse categorically to send its soldiers into harm's way. 
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Admittedly, to discover what it is in the make-up of 
the German psyche that has changed with respect to the 
motivation to accept and implement the use of military 
force is an interesting and stimulating question, but it 
needs a much more sophisticated investigation than this 
thesis can provide. Even an in-depth analysis of the debate 
now being conducted would give greater insight into the 
dynamics and the volatility of the changing German 
political environment. This too is beyond the scope of this 
paper.  But what this paper shows is that this dynamic, 
volatile political decision-making environment has been 
making a qualitative change over the last ten years. It 
remains to be seen how extensive the changes will be, and 
if there will be a mechanism to respond quickly and 
decisively to substantial future military challenges.  
Traditionally convenient rationalizations are losing their 
potency. 
In conclusion, it is important to remember that this 
newly won German self-assurance in taking greater 
responsibility for intervening militarily in areas outside 
of the confines of NATO and Europe has been the product of 
a gradual process, evolving in an environment of pervasive 
skepticism, albeit accelerated by the events of Sept 11. 
This process is at best fluid and by no means complete. On 
the contrary, the debate goes on, and it is quite 
impossible to predict the final form that Germany's 
military preparedness will ultimately take. As the British 
point out, decisions must be made to restructure and 
reequip an antiquated German fighting force, which was set 
up more than 45 years ago to counter the massive threat of 
the Warsaw Pact. 
  46 
A first step was taken in July, 2001, when about a 
billion marks was allotted for the next several years to 
initiate structural changes. It has also become painfully 
clear that conscription is no longer adequate to the needs 
of an effective German army. Currently, more than half of 
all eligible young German men opt not to serve in the 
Bundeswehr. They choose to do civilian service 
(Zivildienst) instead. The word "Kriegsdienstverweigerer" 
(conscientious objector) is not used. This waning readiness 
to do military service is most probably a consequence of 
several factors, including the above-mentioned successfully 
imposed post World War II pacifism, the unsuccessful U.S. 
involvement in Vietnam, and a widespread reluctance on the 
part of German youth, in general, to identify with national 
symbols. For many Germans patriotism is almost an oxymoron. 
Significantly, women have recently been allowed to join the 
combat ranks in the German army.  
Regardless of the form(s) the restructuring of the 
Bundeswehr takes, it is obvious that the needed changes, 
which are only just beginning, will also require extremely 
large sums of money.  However, the German government 
currently does not have either the money or the all-
important political mandate to raise these funds. 
Hopefully, the democratic resolve of the German electorate 
will compel the political leadership to act decisively in 
favor of Germany assuming a responsible leadership position 
in the defense of Europe and in proactively acting to 
secure the interests of Europe around the world.  It will 
take a giant "Ruck vorwärts" (a sudden jerk forward) said 
Roman Herzog, the former president of the republic, as he 
attempted to answer the question why Germany, as a whole, 
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was slow comparised with its European counterparts, to 
adapt to the changing needs of a united Europe. The need 
for a modern military has certainly been recognized, and 
this paper has shown, Germany within the last ten years has 
gradually moved in the direction of taking more 
responsibility for the defense of a united Europe. It 
remains to be seen if, the events of Sept 11 have provided 
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